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"Academic freedom" of teachers.
Facts: In this case a teacher, Alfred Wilder, in the Jefferson County, Colorado school district was dismissed for, among other things, showing the film 1900 to his logic and debate class. The film, rated "R" by the Motion Picture Association of America, contains scenes involving nudity, sexual conduct, drug use, and violence. The hearing examiner found that Wilder was unaware of the district’s policy requiring 20 days written notice to the principal before showing controversial material and recommended that the teacher be retained. The Board of Education directed the superintendent to dismiss the teacher on the grounds that teacher should have known to seek administrative approval even if he was not aware of the board policy on the subject. The Colorado Court of Appeals concluded that Wilder’s First Amendment rights were violated by the lack of notice of the board’s policy and the board’s decision to dismiss was arbitrary and capricious. The court did not address the issue of "whether the teacher’s First Amendment right to use a particular teaching method outweighs the Board’s legitimate pedagogical interests in regulating course content." This case raises the same issue as that in Boring v. Buncombe, which is currently before the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals en banc and Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized School District, which is expected to be heard by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in January.
SUPREME COURT, STATE OF COLORADO
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Case No. 97SC92
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BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE
NATIONAL SCHOOL BOARDS ASSOCIATION
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER
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BOARD OF EDUCATION OF JEFFERSON COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT R-1,
Petitioner,
v.
ALFRED E. WILDER,
Respondent.
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On Certiorari to the
Colorado Court of Appeals
Case No. 96CA0709
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INTEREST OF AMICUS
The National School Boards Association (NSBA) is a not-for-profit federation of this nation’s 49 state school boards associations, the Hawaii State Board of Education, and the boards of education of the District of Columbia, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Founded in 1940, NSBA represents approximately 97,000 of the nation's school board members, who, in turn, govern the schools attended by 97 percent of all U.S. public school children.
The individuals who compose this nation's school boards are elected or appointed community representatives. They are responsible under state law for school district fiscal management, staffing, continuity and for educational standards and materials, including textbooks and other curricular materials.
All school boards in this country have a substantial interest in preserving their authority and responsibility, as representatives of the parents and taxpayers in their communities, and for making final decisions on the content of curricular material and the manner in which such material is presented to the students.
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The sole issue on which this brief is presented is whether the Respondent has a protected free speech right under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution to show the film 1900 to his class, thus giving rise to a requirement of prior notice.
ARGUMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
No single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local control over the operation of schools; local autonomy has long been thought essential both to the maintenance of community concern and support for public schools and to quality of the educational process . . . local control over the educational process affords citizens an opportunity to participate in decision-making, permits the structuring of school programs to fit local needs, and encourages "experimentation, innovation and a healthy competition for education excellence."
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741 (1974).
The U.S. Supreme Court has held on several occasions that education is not a guaranteed right under the U.S. Constitution and, therefore, that where educational policy is at issue, local priorities and standards will control. "[T]he judiciary is well advised to refrain from imposing on the States inflexible constitutional restraints that could circumscribe or handicap the continued research and experimentation so vital to finding even partial solutions to educational problems and to keeping abreast of ever-changing conditions." San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 44 (1973). "[T]he determination of what manner of speech in the classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the school board." Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). "We reject respondents' suggestion that school officials be permitted to exercise prepublication control over school-sponsored publications only pursuant to specific written regulations. To require such regulations in the context of a curricular activity could unduly constrain the ability of educators to educate." Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 n. 6 (1988).
Every state constitution guarantees the right of every child to a free public education. In order to assure that the people in each community have the freedom to decide what type of education will be provided to their children, states have adopted a system that grants ultimate authority over public school management to elected1 lay school boards at the local level.
If the court of appeals decision were to become the law of this state, that would destroy this system in Colorado. The effect of the decision is to remove ultimate curriculum authority from the school board and place that authority in the hands of judges.
The issue before this Court is not whether the film 1900 has "literary and artistic value" as found by the hearing officer. Some educators might agree that the students in the class have the "ability and maturity to understand the purpose of the movie." Other educators might have a different view. But the school board and school administration must retain the last word on choice of curriculum. If teachers, parents and others in the community believe the decisions are misguided, there are avenues to complain. The fact that one disagrees with the decision is not sufficient reason to expect a court to overturn it. Over the years decisions by school boards to remove or refuse to remove curricular materials have been upheld by federal courts that recognize that the board must be the ultimate authority for making these choices, regardless of whether the court would have made the same educational decision. See, e.g., Mozert v. Hawkins County Public Schools, 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988), (refusing to allow child to "opt out" of core curriculum reading course); Smith v. Board of School Comm. of Mobile, 827 F.2d 684 (11th Cir. 1987) (refusing to require school board to remove books from curriculum that are offensive to parents’ religious beliefs); Virgil v. School Bd. Of Columbia County, 862 F.2d 1917 (11th Cir. 1989) (refusing to overturn board decision to remove "inappropriate" material from the curriculum).
It is true that none of these decisions involved the question of the termination of a teacher’s employment because of his or her decision regarding curriculum materials. That fact, however, is important only as it relates to the teacher’s property interest in his or her employment and whether procedural due process was afforded the teacher. Respondent in this case is not claiming that his due process rights were abridged, although the decision below is based on the alleged failure of the district to provide adequate notice. The sole issue before the court is whether Respondent has a free speech right in the choice of curriculum materials. The question of whether Respondent had adequate notice that his conduct was considered inappropriate is not a question which need be considered in order to determine the free speech issue.
II. COURTS SHOULD REFRAIN FROM BECOMING INVOLVED IN MATTERS OF EDUCATIONAL POLICY
Educational policy is strictly a matter for state and local education officials. Courts should not intervene in curriculum decisions in absence of a state statutory violation or a clear constitutional violation, such as a showing that the state intended to establish a religion by including or excluding certain materials from the curriculum. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed courts not to substitute their own judgment for the judgment of school officials. See, e.g. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 328 (1973), holding that "[i]t is not the role of the federal court to set aside decisions of school administrators which the court may view as lacking a basis in wisdom or compassion."; Board of Education of Rogers, Ark. v. McCluskey, 458 U.S. 966 (1982), reversing a lower court holding under the due process clause that the school board unreasonably interpreted a rule against alcoholic beverages; and Board of Education of Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982), holding that courts, in assuring that the requirements of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act are met, must take care to avoid imposing their view of preferable educational methods upon states.
This admonition is particularly true with respect to educational content, for if courts assume the authority to make curriculum choices, the public school system cannot survive. Parents and teachers disagreeing with the philosophy underlying the school board's curricular decisions would file lawsuits asking courts to set standards for determining what is educationally appropriate for the schools to teach. Of course, states and school boards should be sensitive to the concerns of parents and others in the community. But it is one thing to be asked to be sensitive to the concerns of various segments of the public and quite another to be threatened with a lawsuit if particular demands are not met. "[L]imitations on parochialism in the local schools should ordinarily be imposed by the people of the state acting through the legislature, and not by the courts." Developments in the Law: Academic Freedom, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1045, 1055 (1968).
The role of the school board in overseeing curriculum decisions is not easy. For every view regarding a textbook, play or other curricular material, there is an opposing view. Boards receive requests to remove books from the curriculum for varying reasons: sometimes because they are considered too ribald for young students, e.g., Virgil v. School Board of Columbia County, Florida, 862 F.2d 1917 (11th Cir. 1989), or because the material is perceived as anti-Semitic (Merchant of Venice) or racist (Huckleberry Finn), or because the textbooks portray women solely in traditional roles. See, e.g., Rosenberg v. Board of Educ., 196 Misc. 542, 92 N.Y.S.2d 344 (1949).
Balancing between the competing interests of members of the public and the state's interest in inculcation of basic community values is primarily a matter for state education agencies and local school boards. In Fraser v. Bethel School Dist. No. 403, 755 F.2d 1356, 1363 (9th Cir. 1985), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the school board, in disciplining a student for use of sexual innuendo in a speech before a student assembly, violated the student's free speech rights thereby "increas[ing] the risk of cementing white, middle-class standards for determining what is acceptable and proper speech and behavior in our public schools." The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding:
Nothing in the Constitution prohibits the states from insisting that certain modes of expression are inappropriate and subject to sanctions. The inculcation of these values is truly the "work of the school" [citation omitted]. The determination of what manner of speech in the classroom or in the school assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the school board.
Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683.
The discretion for making curriculum decisions must rest somewhere. Whatever educational or managerial arguments may be made in favor of the decision being lodged in teachers or in some other person or persons, there is no federal constitutional prohibition against the discretion being lodged in the local school board. Minarcini v. Strongsville City School District, 541 F.2d 577, 579-80 (6th Cir. 1976).
Other school boards may elect to give teachers more authority over curriculum decisions than did the board in this case. But it is not the province of the courts to decide whether a board's policy regarding teacher discretion in making curriculum decisions is wise.
Although teachers' professional training and experience may give them special competence in matters of pedagogical methodology, often curricular decisions involve important value judgments concerning the proper allocation of societal resources or the aims sought to be accomplished by public education. These are ultimately political questions which the expertise of teachers does not provide any special competency in answering.
Stephen R. Goldstein, The Asserted Constitutional Right of Public School Teachers to Determine What They Teach, 124 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1293, 1356 (1973).
If the Respondent is correct in his claim that his free speech rights were infringed in this case, then teachers have an absolute right under the First Amendment to teach whatever they want, and from whatever texts or other educational material they desire, in the absence of some kind of notice which would also be subject to court interpretation. In Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967), the U.S. Supreme Court discussed "academic freedom" in the context of New York’s Feinberg Law which was designed to weed out so-called "subversives" from the teaching ranks of New York’s schools. There is no doubt that the First Amendment was designed to protect against such laws. But pre-employment loyalty oaths such as that in Keyishian are a far cry from the type of "academic freedom" that Respondent is seeking to create in this case. Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1075 (11th Cir. 1991). If the term "academic freedom" is used in the context of pre-employment screening as to political and social beliefs, then clearly the First Amendment protects the teacher’s "academic freedom" and proscribes such screening. However, that "academic freedom" does not extend to curricular materials or pedagogical methods. Those matters are strictly the province of the local school board and the administration of the schools. And the First Amendment does not transfer authority to make these decisions from democratically accountable boards of education to teachers or to courts. Certainly, as a matter of education policy one would hope that great weight would be given to the educational views of experienced teachers but as a matter of constitutional law, no weight need be afforded to teachers’ views.
[One function of elementary and secondary education is] indoctrination to transmit to succeeding generations the body of knowledge and set of values shared by members of the community -- some measure of public regulation of classroom speech is inherent in the very provision of public education . . . The function of the school has traditionally been viewed as the transmission rather than the discovery of knowledge.
Developments in the Law - Academic Freedom, 81 Harvard L. Rev. 1045, 1953 (1968).
It is the job of the school board to maintain a balance between the educational value of giving teachers free reign in the classroom and the countervailing interest of the community in inculcating basic community values in students.
In secondary schools, it is true, the idea of academic freedom may be balanced to a degree by the countervailing interest of states, acting through local school boards, to inculcate basic community values in students who may not be mature enough to deal with academic freedom as understood or practiced at higher educational levels. [Citations omitted.]
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[The role of the courts is] not to choose the better educational policy. [Courts] may intervene in the decisions of school authorities only when it has been shown that they have strayed outside the area committed to their discretion . . . Because teaching is by definition an expressive activity, virtually every decision made by school authorities would raise First Amendment issues calling for federal court intervention.
East Hartford Educ. Assn. v. Board of Education, 562 F.2d 838, 844, 859 (2d Cir. 1977).
The public schools were designed to reflect values and morals of the community, as well as to teach the basic skills of reading, writing and arithmetic. Public schools are not a free marketplace of ideas in the sense that colleges and universities are.
The state may establish its curriculum either by law or by delegation of its authority to the local school boards and communities [citations omitted]. This is in part a deference to local control which is a recognition of the varying wants and needs of the Nation's diverse and varied communities, each with its unique character, standard and sense of social importance with a variety of values.
Mercer v. Michigan State Board of Education, 379 F. Supp. 580, 585 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
Within school systems there must be a certain level of central direction and standardization in curriculum materials. Especially in larger systems, centralization is necessary in order to ensure a prescribed minimum level of instruction and quality of materials from building to building and within the classrooms of each building. Within these structures, certainly there should be sufficient flexibility to respond to particular student needs, variances in teaching style and teacher preference. That flexibility, however, must be subordinate to the standards set for the entire school system. And, providing the school system’s decisions are indeed "educational" and not politically partisan or discriminatory, it is not the province of the courts to decide whether they are appropriate.
The court below opines that Respondent has a "right to use a particular teaching method," the question being whether that right is outweighed by the school district’s right to regulate content, a question the court does not answer because of its ruling that First Amendment rights were abridged by the failure of advance notice. But the court misses the point. Teachers do not have First Amendment rights to exercise state power in a manner of their own choosing through their teaching methodologies. They have property rights giving rise to notice requirements before they can be terminated or suspended. They may have free speech rights to complain about regulations over their teaching methodologies, but they do not have a free speech right to their teaching methodologies. If they do, then it is the courts and not the education officials who will make the final decision as to whether the school board’s educational methodologies or the teachers’ prevail. That is not the law and should not be.
III. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT'S STANDARD IN HAZELWOOD REQUIRES ONLY THAT THE DECISION HAVE A RATIONAL EDUCATIONAL BASIS. IT DOES NOT AUTHORIZE COURTS TO SUBSTITUTE THEIR OWN EDUCATIONAL VIEW.
The court of appeals misapplied the Supreme Court's standard in Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 258 (1988). The Supreme Court in that case ruled that students do not have a free speech right in the choice of curricular materials. The "legitimate pedagogical concern" standard addresses only the question of whether the suppression of speech is related to the education of the students rather than to some other non-educational motive such as suppressing all references to the Democratic party while urging discussions about the Republican party or suppression of discussions about Catholics but not Protestants or suppression of discussions of evolution for religious reasons. The issue is not whether a court agrees with the educational decision but whether the decision was, in fact, educational.
Like it or not, it is the province of school boards to set education policy and for the administrators to enforce it. Their decisions may not always be the most progressive, but by their nature, they are based on the views of the community given voice through the school board members as to what is educationally sound. The democratic process does not always result in the best decision, but at least local elected officials are in a better position than the courts to work with educators and the community to develop educational policy.
In Seyfried v. Walton, 668 F.2d 214 (3rd Cir. 1981), the Third Circuit upheld the decision of a superintendent canceling a high school production of a musical play, Pippin, stating that the decision to cancel the production was no different than other administrative decisions involving allocation of educational resources and did not offend the students' First Amendment rights.
Plaintiffs in Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980), argued that the board violated First Amendment rights of students by removing certain books and courses from the curriculum. They argued that the books were removed because "particular words in the books offended their social, political and moral tastes and not because the books, taken as a whole, were lacking in educational value." Id. at 1302. The court upheld the school board's action, stating:
[T]he importance of secondary schools in the development of intellectual faculties is only one part of a broad formative role encompassing the encouragement and nurturing of those fundamental social, political, and moral values that will permit a student to take his place in the community . . .
The need for intellectual and moral guidance from a body capable of transmitting the mores of the community has led most state legislatures to lodge primary responsibility for secondary school education in local school boards, which generally have considerable authority to regulate the specifics of the classroom.
Id. at 1304, 1305.
Hazelwood made clear that in the classroom and in activities such as the presentation of the film at issue here, school boards do have the constitutional authority to regulate expressive speech because of the ideas expressed therein. The Court upheld the principal's removal of certain articles from the newspaper because the ideas contained therein were deemed to be inappropriate for a school-sponsored newspaper. The standard established by the Court in Hazelwood is nothing more than a rational basis standard. It places the burden on the Respondent to show that the decision was based on improper non-educational reasons.
Board discretion is not completely unfettered. Teachers may not be terminated without appropriate notice of policies and standards and other due process protections. Teachers retain the right to be free from state religious indoctrination and enjoy the right to free expression as citizens. For example, the board would not have had the authority under the Constitution to terminate Respondent in retaliation for his writing to a local radio station to complain about the board's decision to prohibit his showing of the film 1900. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
Because of the special characteristics of a classroom environment, in applying Hazelwood instead of Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968)] we distinguish between teachers' classroom expression and teachers' expression in other situations that would not reasonably be perceived as school-sponsored.
Miles v. Denver Public Schools, 944 F.2d 773, 777 (10th Cir. 1991).
There are usually two sides to an issue, and it is better that educational debates be held in school board meetings where all segments of the public are assured a voice than in the courthouse. Thus, the "wants and needs of a tiny rural community wherein [a particular book, play or course of study] might be vehemently opposed, and the wants and needs of the cosmopolitan university oriented community that might be overwhelmingly in favor of [the book, play or course of study] are both accommodated." Mercer v. Michigan State Board of Education, 379 F. Supp. 580 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
A board can make any curricular decision it pleases based on the beliefs it holds that are relevant to the needs and desire of its citizens. Boards are elected to do just that and can also be defeated if the community in which they are located feels that their decisions are not in accordance with community values. As long as the board's decision is educational and not merely a pretext for some invalid purpose, the courts should not second guess that decision. Respondent merely complains that the board should not have terminated him because of his failure to consult with his principal before showing the film 1900.
The interest of the teacher in making educational decisions as to what will be included in the curriculum is subordinate to the state's interest in maintaining an effective educational system and the teacher’s "interest" is not a constitutional interest.
[S]tate regulation of a teacher's classroom activities ought to be upheld if there is anything in the record to establish a rational relationship between such regulations and the State's interest in ensuring that its children receive conventional instruction.
48 N.Y. L. Rev. 1176, 1195 (1973).
However meritorious one might believe the opinion of the teacher to be in a particular debate, the teacher has no free speech right to make the ultimate decision on a matter of educational policy.
Teachers may work for the school system upon the reasonable terms laid down by the proper authorities [of the state]. If they do not choose to work on such terms, they are free to retain their beliefs and associations and go elsewhere . . . A teacher works in a sensitive area in a schoolroom. There he shapes the attitude of young minds towards the society in which they live. In this, the state has a vital concern. It must preserve the vitality of the schools.
Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
IV. THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE RESPONDENT RECEIVED ADEQUATE NOTICE THAT HIS ACTIONS COULD SUBJECT HIM TO DISCIPLINE IS A PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS QUESTION, AND DOES NOT IMPLICATE THE FIRST AMENDMENT. RESPONDENT HAS NOT RAISED DUE PROCESS AS AN ISSUE IN THIS APPEAL.
The court of appeals decision confuses due process with First Amendment principles. It cites Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 449, 453 (1st Cir.1993), for the proposition that "[e]ven if a school may prohibit a teacher's statement before she make them, . . . it is not entitled to retaliate against speech that it never prohibited." If a school board does not violate free speech rights by its prior restraint of a teacher's statements, how can it be said that his free speech rights have been trammeled by punishment after he makes such statements. The court in Ward based its remarks regarding notice on Mailloux v. Kiley, 448 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir. 1971). That case, however, did not question the absolute right of the school board to determine the appropriateness of teaching methods. The case stands only for the proposition that procedural due process requires notice to the teacher before sanctions are imposed.
The district court found that the Respondent's conduct was within standards reasonably, although not universally recognized, and that he acted in good faith and without notice that these defendants, as his superiors, were not of that view. Sanctions in this circumstance would be a denial of due process. [Emphasis supplied.]
Mailloux v. Kiley, 448 F.2d at 1243. [In fact, the court in Mailloux was unable to conclude that the First Amendment was inplicated at all.]
Even if the due process issue had been raised in this appeal, it would still be important to make a clear distinction between a free speech violation and a due process violation. First, school boards must retain their absolute right over curriculum, course and extracurricular materials and teaching methods, subject only to a rational basis limitation. Such decisions should not be under scrutiny of courts, even if the decisions appear to be unsound, which Amicus submits is not the case here. The right of the school board to render those decisions is separate from the issue of the enforcement of educational standards through sanctions against teachers. Teachers, of course, cannot be deprived of a property or liberty right without due process of law, which includes notice and an opportunity for a hearing.
The Government cannot deprive citizens of free speech rights, with or without notice. If Respondent has a free speech right to choose curriculum without interference by the school board, then it does not matter whether the school board notified him in advance that ‘R’ rated films must be precleared. If Respondent does not have such a free speech right, then the question of notice is relevant only to whether he was deprived of a property or liberty right without due process.
The court below cites the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967), for the proposition that a school board violates teachers' free speech rights by failing to provide notice of what speech or expressive conduct is prohibited. That case involved a state statute making "treasonable or seditious" words or acts grounds for removal from public school system or state employment. Undoubtedly, the same statute would be held unconstitutional by the current U.S. Supreme Court. First, the language in the decision regarding "academic freedom" and the "marketplace of ideas," must be viewed in the light of more recent cases such as Fraser and Hazelwood, in which the U.S. Supreme Court made clear that the discretion of the school board and school officials controls in making decision regarding curriculum content and what is appropriate in the classroom. Under the New York statute which was the subject of the decision in Keyishian, teachers could be fired or refused employment because of their seditious remarks inside or outside the classroom. Thus, to the extent the Government could restrain some of the speech of teachers, notice in a due process sense would be required. The question of whether Respondent's termination constituted a due process violation is not before this court so the issue of notice is not relevant here. The sole issue before this court is whether the teacher has a free speech right to select a film for use in the classroom. The U.S. Supreme Court has yet to rule on the issue before this court in the case at bar. It would thus appear that the High Court's more recent opinions such as Fraser and Hazelwood are more analogous to the facts in this case than are the facts in Keyishian.
CONCLUSION
It would appear that any teacher should know that the showing of an ‘R’ rated film in the classroom could raise objections or concerns by some parents and therefore warranted some kind of discussion with the administration before showing the film. Amicus submits that a policy is not even necessary to tell teachers that gross language, nudity and sexual intercourse are subjects which are not routinely a part of the secondary curriculum. Respondent lost his job for his failure to perceive what would seem to be the obvious. Nevertheless, some might believe that the punishment was too severe. Perhaps it was. But, that is not for anyone but the board to say.
The forum to raise concerns about curriculum decisions is not the courts. It is in school board meetings, petitions by parents, political campaigns and petitions to state legislatures. Curriculum is by its very nature selective, and the school board, as the elected representative of the public, has the duty to make that selection based on community values.
Amicus submits that the only legal principle that makes sense is one that holds that the school board has the discretion to select and remove curriculum materials at will, in absence of some other constitutional problem such as establishment of religion or equal protection, One may disagree as to the action taken by the board, but no contention has been raised that the reason for its decision was not educational.
Finally, the question of notice is not relevant in the First Amendment context. If, arguendo, the board failed to provide adequate notice to Respondent of its policy on controversial materials, that would raise a due process question, but First Amendment rights are not created by the failure of notice to the speaker that he will be disciplined for expression that otherwise enjoys no constitutional protection.
Respectfully submitted,
GWENDOLYN H. GREGORY (No. 008569)
Counsel of Record |
AUGUST W. STEINHILBER
NSBA General Counsel |
Deputy General Counsel
National School Boards Association (NSBA)
1680 Duke Street
Alexandria, VA 22314
(703) 838-6712
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